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Alfred the Great and Ceolwulf II
The Relationship between King Alfred 
the Great and Ceolwulf II of Mercia 
(874-c.879) 
Brent Weisberg, University of Pennsylvania
Introduction
 Studying King Ceolwulf II of Mercia presents one 
with a situation not unlike the one former US Secretary of 
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s described concerning American 
intelligence work in Iraq in 2002: "there are known knowns… 
there are known unknowns… but there are also unknown 
unknowns."1 The "known knowns" of Ceolwulf ’s reign are 
few and far between. All we have to bear witness to the life and 
legacy of Ceolwulf, the last independent ruler of Mercia, are two 
charters of his, a few mentions in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle as 
well as two of its likely derivatives, and several dozen coins.2 The 
few coins we have, particularly examples of Two Emperors type 
coins from the recent Watlington hoard find, provide material 
evidence of Ceolwulf ’s reign that may be used to corroborate or 
contravene literary evidence.3 I shall seek to elucidate the history 
of Ceolwulf that I discern to be most plausible through the lens 
of his relationships with King Alfred of Wessex and the Vikings. 
My aim is to identify the shadowy figure of King Ceolwulf II of 
Mercia from the way he affected his contemporaries in the arena 
of late-ninth-century power politics.
 An overview of the debate in the secondary literature 
regarding Alfred’s narrative sources is vital because these sources 
underpin any construction of Ceolwulf ’s history. These sources 
grant a few choice glimpses into Ceolwulf ’s reign that neither 
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documentary nor numismatic sources can transmit. An issue 
arises from the fact that these sources were almost certainly the 
work of agents within the kingdom of Ceolwulf ’s contemporary, 
King Alfred of Wessex. As Davis wrote, a central issue the historian 
faces in working on the period of Alfred’s reign (871-99) is "the 
possibility that almost all the sources may have originated with 
either Alfred himself or his immediate entourage."4 By contrast, 
we have no equivalent narrative records from Ceolwulf ’s 
kingdom to give us more direct insight into the Mercian king’s 
actions or attitudes toward either Alfred or the Vikings. This lack 
of sources forces us to examine the narrative of Ceolwulf ’s reign 
through West Saxon eyes. We must attempt to determine the 
purposes behind the creation of the Chronicle and Asser’s Life for 
further discussion of the sources’ entries concerning Ceolwulf. 
A discussion of Æthelweard’s motivation for creating his own 
version of the Chronicle and the attempt to translate the Old 
English original into a Latin version about a century after the 
former’s publication would probably merit its own dissertation, 
but this will instead be touched on briefly in a subsequent 
section.5
 Davis, Whitelock, and Keynes espoused different views 
regarding the origins and purposes of the Alfredian narrative 
sources. I find a combination of Whitelock and Keynes’ arguments 
most convincing regarding the possible origins and purposes 
of the Chronicle and its derivatives. Davis wrote that Alfred 
probably had a direct hand in the production of the Chronicle 
and intended it to serve a propagandist purpose. He suggested 
that we should view Alfred’s narrative sources as items full of 
exaggerations of accomplishments and omissions of blunders 
toward a goal of inflating Alfred’s triumphs and mitigating his 
disasters. He argued that Alfred’s concurrent efforts to convince 
his contemporaries to work on his kingdom-wide projects of 
building fortresses and improving learning underscores this 
explanation’s probability.6 The upshot of this interpretation 
for the study of Ceolwulf would be to treat all mention of the 
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Mercian king with the utmost scepticism on the grounds that his 
own story may have been refashioned to fit the narrative Alfred 
sought to push. Toward a more holistic view in considering the 
Alfredian narrative sources’ origins, Whitelock countered Davis 
by arguing that the works served broader purposes more suited to 
their genre. After all, Alfred would have had other means, like the 
coins that proclaim his control of London, to issue propagandist 
messages.7 Whitelock further argued based on her assumption 
of the Chronicle’s intended audience that it would have been 
impractical for the compilers to introduce misleading content. 
She questioned how much Alfred "could get away with" when 
the work’s audience, the literate ecclesiastics and nobles of Alfred’s 
era of learning, would have lived through the events themselves.8 
She also argued that there were significant grounds to believe the 
sources originated from Alfred’s court but differed from Davis 
in denying Alfred’s direct involvement. Thus, Whitelock argued, 
Alfred should be viewed not as "Alfred ‘the propagandist’" but 
rather as "Alfred veredicus ‘truth-teller’—an epithet given him by 
Asser, who knew him."9 Combined with Keynes’ argument that 
the Chronicle was possibly intended to promote a pan-Anglo-
Saxon identity among the people under Alfred’s (as opposed 
to Danish) control in the 890s, Whitelock’s view of the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle allows an interpretation of its contents as they 
relate to Ceolwulf as largely faithful to reality. If we believe that 
the work was composed in Alfred’s court and intended for a 
literate audience of Alfred’s officials, it appears too probable that 
they would have balked at outright falsehoods, at least barring 
negative characterisations of their perceived enemies in ways that 
would have accommodated willing suspension of disbelief. In 
summary, the view of the Alfredian narrative sources that I will 
use in this paper is that Alfred probably commissioned the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle, the work on which Æthelweard’s Chronicle 
and Asser’s Life are based, to be crafted by scholars in his court 
toward a goal of a unified narrative whose scope encompassed 
the newly conceived Anglo-Saxon kingdom. I also will argue 
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a case describing Ceolwulf ’s relationships with Alfred and the 
Vikings from the standpoint that the contents of the Chronicle 
and its derivatives probably complied with their contemporary 
audience’s memory, even if they feature selective inclusion and 
omission as well as misleading characterizations such as reference 
to Ceolwulf as "a foolish king’s thegn."10
 The secondary literature discussion of Ceolwulf ’s reign 
itself locates mainly in the work of Haslam, Blackburn, and 
Keynes. Keynes provided a balanced and even set of arguments, 
and I use his findings in my analysis of the relationship between 
Ceolwulf and Alfred as well as between Ceolwulf and the Vikings. 
However, Keynes did not touch directly on the relationship 
between Ceolwulf and the Vikings. My use of Keynes will 
be modified by insights drawn from the recently discovered 
Watlington hoard, which fills in gaps in the corpus of numismatic 
evidence from the period and possibly supports his suspicions 
regarding the Two Emperors type coinage.11 Blackburn provided 
a view of the relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf through 
coinage, and his conclusions have been in part controverted 
by the Watlington hoard discovery, which has significantly 
augmented the corpus of coins from the period.12 In modifying 
the numismatic conclusions both scholars make, I will pay 
particular attention to the expanded corpus of Two Emperors type 
coins. Writing after Keynes, Haslam built a detailed model of 
Ceolwulf ’s reign through analysis of the events of the years 874-
86. The primary sources it rested on, however, do not provide 
sufficient grounds to construct a sequence of events with as much 
conviction as Haslam did. The bottom line is that Haslam’s 
argument is too self-reinforcing and lacks enough convergently 
supportive sources to deem his chronology more than a possible 
sequence of events within the multiplicity of such sequences one 
could construct.13
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Watlington Hoard
Ceolwulf and Alfred
 Given the nature of available sources regarding Ceolwulf, 
I shall present his relationship with Alfred as it evolved from 
c.874 to c.879 according to the three points of rupture that I 
have identified. Documentary and numismatic evidence shall 
serve to augment, temper, or link the accounts given by the 
Chronicle and its derivatives. The first point of rupture in the 
period was the Vikings’ 874 elevation of Ceolwulf to the Mercian 
throne, the second was the 877 division of Mercia between the 
Vikings and Ceolwulf, and the third was the battle of Edington 
and Ceolwulf ’s subsequent disappearance from the historical 
record. I argue that there are grounds to consider the relationship 
between Alfred and Ceolwulf as one at least of somewhat positive 
relations in the period between c.874 and c.877 but that the 
relationship altered decisively in 877 as the sharing of Mercia 
forced Ceolwulf to affirm his role as a partner to the Vikings. 
Furthermore, I argue that there is insufficient information to 
determine Alfred and Ceolwulf's relationship in the aftermath of 
the battle of Edington.
 At first glance, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and its 
derivatives’ characterisation of Ceolwulf suggests a consistently 
negative relationship between the two kings. However, viewed 
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alongside numismatic and documentary evidence, as well as the 
assumption that the sources’ attestations of Ceolwulf ’s actions 
are consistent with reality, these sources suggest a dynamic 
relationship that possibly began as a somewhat positive one. The 
Chronicle’s 874 entry described Ceolwulf ’s appointment to the 
kingdom of the Mercians through an agreement with the Vikings 
and called him "a foolish king’s thegn," giving the impression that 
Ceolwulf was beholden to his Viking superiors and ruled merely 
with their consent.14 However, documentary sources suggest that 
Alfred viewed him as a contemporary ruler while Ceolwulf was 
in power. To explain these conflicting views, one must examine 
the Chronicle in the context of the 890s, where the work appears 
to portray the events of the 870s through the lens of Alfred’s 
goals and ambitions in the former decade. Pratt argued that 
Alfred’s treatment of Ceolwulf in the Chronicle reflects Alfred’s 
intention of furthering his projects of enhancing learning among 
his officials and constructing fortifications across his kingdom.15 
Pratt pointed to Alfred’s literary contributions in the form of 
his preface to St Gregory’s Pastoral Care, among other works, to 
suggest that the 890s were a time in which the West Saxon king 
created "a distinctive Alfredian language of wealth and wisdom" 
in which Alfred engaged in a kind of "performance" as a king 
in the moulds of Solomon and the ideal ruler as described by 
St Gregory.16 Pratt argued that Ceolwulf, a king who had failed 
to secure a lasting rule, possibly made an effective foil within 
Alfred’s new discourse "portraying wisdom as the sole criterion 
for office-holding."17 In addition, establishing Ceolwulf as an 
unqualified ruler who lost his throne as a result of his lack of 
wisdom may have reinforced the idea that Alfred’s officials owed 
their positions of power to their connection to the projects of 
Alfred, from whom wealth and wisdom flowed. Pratt pointed 
to Asser’s account of the king’s offer of "a stark choice between 
loss of office and more attentive study" as a prime example of 
Alfred’s possible use of a "language of wealth and wisdom" to 
shape his kingdom according to the Solomonic and Gregorian 
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archetypes.18 Additionally, Keynes wrote that the Chronicle’s 
denigration of Ceolwulf was probably designed to appease 
Ceolwulf ’s successor, Ealdorman Æthelred, whom it is perhaps 
unlikely Ceolwulf was related to.19 Therefore, there are significant 
grounds to view the Chronicle’s characterization of Ceolwulf 
as a retroactive assessment of the Mercian king’s legacy to suit 
Alfredian purposes. This possible effort to smear Ceolwulf amid 
the political realities of the 890s, however, does not eliminate the 
possibility that the actions that the Chronicle ascribes Ceolwulf 
themselves had a basis in actual political developments. 
 The addition of documentary and numismatic sources 
provides a clearer picture of Ceolwulf ’s reign and may help to put 
the contents of the Chronicle and its derivatives into perspective. 
The few charters that survive from Ceolwulf ’s reign augment the 
narrative sources in a meaningful way by granting choice glances 
into how Ceolwulf probably chose to portray himself and his 
rule to his subjects and contemporaries. An 875 charter, where 
Ceolwulf absolved the diocese of Worcester "from feeding the 
king’s horses and those who lead them" made no mention of 
King Alfred nor the Vikings in its witness list. Additionally, 
Ceolwulf referred to himself as "king of the Mercians" in the 
body of the charter as well as at the top of the witness list.20 These 
aspects of the charter suggest that Ceolwulf presented himself as 
a king in his own right and did not acknowledge requirement 
on his part of Viking permission to grant land and privileges. 
In other Anglo-Saxon charters, non-kings who wished to grant 
land or privileges had to do so with the express permission of 
the king. Additionally, as Blackburn pointed out, this charter’s 
witness list includes many of the same bishops and temporal 
office-holders of western Mercia who had attested the charters of 
Ceolwulf ’s predecessor, King Burgred of Mercia.21 This apparent 
continuity in office-holders’ support from Burgred to Ceolwulf 
makes it appear likely that Ceolwulf ’s contemporaries, notably 
Alfred, viewed Ceolwulf as a king in his own right in the wake of 
his accession to the Mercian throne.
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 Numismatic evidence that probably dates from the period 
after Ceolwulf ’s 874 accession and before his sharing of Mercia 
with the Vikings in 877 suggests that he enjoyed at least neutral 
and possibly friendly relations with Alfred in this period. Whereas 
Blackburn and Keynes argued that the available numismatic 
evidence supported the view that London recognized Alfred as 
its ruler in the first few years after King Burgred’s deposition and 
Ceolwulf ’s ascension, new evidence from the Watlington hoard 
suggests Alfred and Ceolwulf jointly issued coinage like the Two 
Emperors type earlier than previously estimated.22 By extension, 
the nature of Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship in this first period 
possibly developed toward one of neutrality or at least some 
kind of cooperation earlier than previously considered. Precisely 
dating the coin types involved in this analysis is impossible, but 
it is possible to estimate when each type was issued. The Lunettes 
type, which Alfred issued jointly with King Burgred through the 
London mint, was probably discontinued shortly after Burgred’s 
deposition, as Blackburn suggested.23 He also pointed to the 
corpus of Cross-and-Lozenge type coins as indicative of a possible 
shift in the control of London from Alfred to Ceolwulf around 
the 877 sharing of Mercia. The progression of styles in the corpus 
of Cross-and-Lozenge types that he had access to, he argued, 
suggested that the same moneyers struck coins for Alfred and 
then Ceolwulf but did not do so concurrently.24 Additionally, 
Blackburn dated the restoration of fineness observed in the 
Cross-and-Lozenge type to c.875-6 because, without hindsight, it 
appeared "between 875 and 877… the Danes had been bought off 
and Alfred might reasonably have thought that his worst troubles 
were behind him."25 For his part, Blackburn did not make a case 
for the political implications of the Two Emperors type.26 The first 
portion of Blackburn’s argument, that the Cross-and-Lozenge type 
may indicate that London was in Alfred’s sole possession until 
c.877, does not hold up in the light of newer Watlington hoard 
evidence that increases the corpus of Two Emperors type coins 
from just two examples to fifteen.27 The discovery of these coins 
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allows for ascribing the kind of importance neither Keynes nor 
Blackburn dared grant the two coins that they were aware of. 
This coinage type predates the Cross-and-Lozenge type because 
it is of a lesser fineness than the rebased Cross-and-Lozenge type 
and, like the rebased type, features each king on separate coins 
from the same London moneyers.28 Here I agree with Blackburn’s 
argument that it is possible that Alfred’s rebasement of the coinage 
happened c.875-6 during what may have appeared to the West 
Saxons as a period of long respite from Viking attack.29 Keynes 
agreed, again with only the two then-known examples of the 
Two Emperors type to go on, with the more conservative period 
of c.875-c.878.30 This possible date of rebasement would then 
place the Two Emperors type in the period between the c.874 
deposition of Burgred and the c.875-6 issuance of the first Cross-
and-Lozenge type coins. Thus, it is possible that Alfred shared 
control of London with Ceolwulf until at least c.875-6. The 
picture of the period c.874 to c.877 that the current numismatic 
evidence appears to point to is that the monetary union that 
almost certainly existed between Alfred and Burgred, evidenced 
in the Lunettes type, continued in the form of the Two Emperors 
and Cross-and-Lozenge types once Ceolwulf was secure enough in 
his position as king of Mercia to exert influence over London’s 
moneyers. This union was probably strong to implement a 
reform as large as the rebasement of the joint coinage type in 
the form of the Cross-and-Lozenge type, suggesting a certain level 
of accommodation and cooperation between the two kings in 
the period. The nature of the two kings’ working relationship 
in this period may have been one of a greater and lesser partner, 
as Keynes suggested, pointing to coins from the types the kings 
jointly minted on which Alfred is styled "rex A" and "rex S M," 
which Keynes argued should be interpreted as "rex A(nglorum)" 
and "rex S(axonum et) M(erciorum)."31 These suggestions are 
compelling, and it does appear possible that the kings at least 
nominally observed a relationship that portrayed Alfred as the 
superior partner and Ceolwulf the inferior partner.
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 Narrative and numismatic evidence provide grounds to 
support the view that the aftermath of the 877 peace at Exeter and 
the ensuing sharing of Mercia led to a realignment in the political 
structure of southern England and, consequently, represented 
an inflection point in Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship. The 
877 sharing of Mercia between Ceolwulf and the Vikings may 
have entailed a change in Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship in 
that the Viking demand to divide the kingdom probably forced 
Ceolwulf to pick a side between Alfred and his Danish overlords. 
This side-selection may be reflected in numismatic evidence 
that points to the possibility that Ceolwulf was the sole ruler 
of London, having excluded Alfred, after 877 and at least up to 
the battle of Edington. For his part, Ceolwulf may have felt he 
had no choice, as the 874 entry in the Chronicle relates: when 
the Vikings elevated Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne, the new 
king "swore oaths to them and gave hostages, that [the kingdom] 
should be ready for them on whatever day they wished to have it, 
and he would be ready, himself and all who would follow him, at 
the enemy’s service."32
 The Alfred-Guthrum treaty, which Keynes estimated 
to c.880-90, after Ceolwulf ’s potential 879 demise and before 
Guthrum’s death in 890, may provide indirect evidence of the 
aftermath of the 877 sharing of Mercia.33 That is, the terms of the 
treaty dividing southern England between Alfred and Guthrum’s 
Vikings roughly cut Mercia in half, granting to Guthrum the 
territory the Vikings probably settled in 877 and granting to 
Alfred the territory Ceolwulf probably had retained from 877 
onward.34 Taking together the terms of the treaty and the 877 
Chronicle entry points to a separation of Mercia into two discrete 
parts: one in the southwest including London ruled by Ceolwulf 
and one in the northeast ruled by the Vikings. Æthelweard’s 
account of 877 may provide insight into why Ceolwulf chose 
to go along with the Vikings in the sharing of Mercia and 
exclusion of Alfred from London. He reported that the Vikings 
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"ravaged the kingdom of the Mercians" in 877.35 The Vikings 
possibly conducted this ravaging of Ceolwulf ’s lands to maintain 
overlordship over the king in the aftermath of a series of Viking 
reverses at Alfred’s hands over the course of 876 and 877. The 
possibility that Æthelweard may have conflated Viking ravaging, 
or mistaken ravaging in Mercia with Viking ravaging elsewhere 
should be dismissed. Æthelweard almost certainly had access 
to sources that we do not have the privilege of interacting with 
today, wrote just a generation or two beyond the reach of living 
memory of the events of Ceolwulf ’s reign, and created his own 
Chronicle as a scholarly exercise to translate the original Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle into Latin. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that 
he would have embellished the truth about the events of 877. 
However, Æthelweard’s placement of the single instance of land-
sharing in his Chronicle in 875 was probably a chronological 
mistake.36 It is likely that the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, with its 
own singular instance of Viking land-sharing during Ceolwulf ’s 
reign, is more consistent with reality.37 Thus, there are grounds to 
conclude that Ceolwulf sided with the Vikings in 877 and exerted 
power over London to Alfred’s exclusion. Here, the second part of 
Blackburn’s chronology is compatible with the Cross-and-Lozenge 
evidence: stylistic analysis of the two kings’ coinage of this type, 
led him to conclude that the perceived latest examples in the 
collection, feature only Ceolwulf. Therefore, he argued, there are 
grounds to conclude that a political shift occurred in the late 
870s that led to London’s moneyers’ no longer minting coins 
for Alfred.38 This conclusion also corroborates my argument that 
Ceolwulf chose in c.877 (or rather was coerced into choosing) a 
side in the ongoing confrontation between Alfred and the Vikings 
because, if the relationship between the two kings soured, their 
monetary union, particularly their sharing of London moneyers, 
would have become untenable. Unfortunately, Watlington hoard 
evidence cannot yet be used to modify this conclusion, as similar 
stylistic analysis of the much-expanded corpus of Cross-and-
Lozenge type coins is required.39 
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 The battle of Edington and its aftermath represent the 
opaquest point of rupture in Alfred and Ceolwulf ’s relationship. 
There is no mention of Ceolwulf in literary sources after this 
date; we can only conjecture based on evidence from coinage and 
conclusions concerning Ceolwulf ’s trajectory up to this point. 
Coinage evidence is difficult to pin down. The Watlington hoard 
may be dated, as Williams and Naylor do, to c.879-80 based on 
the presence of a single coin of the Two-Line type which itself was 
probably first issued c.879-80—and a lack of later coins in the 
hoard.40 Even if this date of deposition is accurate, it is unknown 
why the hoard’s contents were deposited and by whom. The 
method of basing conclusions on what may have happened in 
the years before Edington is decidedly unsatisfactory because the 
late ninth century was a time in which all manner of misfortune 
might befall a ruler. As Asser described, King Alfred was himself 
wracked from the day of his wedding with a strange and painful 
illness.41 Moreover, there is no record of Ceolwulf ’s age or health 
during his reign, and his sudden departure from the historical 
record may conceivably reflect a development beyond the agency 
of Alfred or the Vikings. 
 The above analysis entails a summary of the sequence of 
developments in the relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf 
from c. 874 to c. 879. Based on numismatic evidence in the 
form of the Two Emperors type, Ceolwulf probably managed to 
consolidate power in 874 in the aftermath of Burgred’s deposition 
and his own accession to the Mercian throne to reassert a 
significant degree of control over London, which he probably 
shared to some extent with King Alfred.42 Ceolwulf was most 
likely recognized as a king by most people from c.874 to c.877, as 
Ceolwulf ’s surviving charters seem to demonstrate, particularly 
the 875 charter for the diocese of Worcester.43 It is difficult to 
argue that this recognition of Ceolwulf as a king in his own 
right continued after 877, when, based on the Chronicle’s 877 
entry, the Vikings probably forced him to divide the kingdom 
of Mercia between themselves.44 Numismatic evidence suggests 
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that Ceolwulf ruled London to Alfred’s exclusion after 877 while 
continuing to style himself as king of Mercia on the coinage 
he issued.45 Thus, there are grounds to conclude that Alfred 
and Ceolwulf enjoyed somewhat positive relations as superior 
and inferior rulers, respectively, while they jointly issued coins 
in London up to the 877 sharing of Mercia. After the sharing, 
however, when Ceolwulf established himself as the sole ruler of 
London, it appears this monetary union, and possibly any sense 
of goodwill that existed between them, had ended. Finally, what 
transpired between the two kings following the battle of Edington 
is at present impossible to establish, as insufficient evidence exists 
regarding Ceolwulf from c.877-80.
 The argument that I have posited, that there are grounds 
to believe Ceolwulf ’s neighbours recognized him as a king prior 
to the 877 sharing of Mercia, aligns with Keynes’ conclusion 
that Alfred and Ceolwulf enjoyed "mutual (if unequal) respect 
as rulers of ‘English’ England" in the mid-870s.46 Keynes reached 
this conclusion mainly based on the Cross-and-Lozenge type 
coins available to him, though his inferences based on the two 
Two Emperors coins available to him were probably accurate.47 
Indeed, as evidenced by the number of Two Emperors coins in 
the Watlington hoard, the two kings probably jointly issued 
the type until c.875-6, when they also issued the rebased Cross-
and-Lozenge coinage. This joint production probably continued 
until 877, the year Ceolwulf aligned with the Vikings to Alfred’s 
exclusion and became the sole issuer of Cross-and-Lozenge coins.48 
The conclusions Blackburn drew from his stylistic analysis of 
Cross-and-Lozenge coins inform my own conclusions regarding 
Ceolwulf ’s 877 alignment with the Vikings. However, my pre-
877 chronology, which argues for a relationship between Alfred 
and Ceolwulf in this period that was possibly characterized 
by cooperation, opposes the first part of Blackburn’s own 
chronology.49 Based on pre-Watlington numismatic evidence, 
he concluded that London was under Alfred’s sole control from 
Ceolwulf ’s 874 accession until 877, when Ceolwulf assumed 
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control of the city with Viking help.50 I argue that Blackburn 
was mistaken about the kings’ relationship in this period because 
he largely disregarded both Two Emperors coins of which he was 
aware  and based his findings on the Cross-and-Lozenge type 
coins to which he had access. However, I find the second part of 
Blackburn’s chronology convincing: that the Cross-and-Lozenge 
evidence points to a shift in the control of London toward 
Ceolwulf as the sole ruler of the city following Alfred’s 876-7 
confrontation with the Vikings.51 I argue that the 877 treaty of 
Exeter and subsequent sharing of Mercia probably precipitated 
this shift, although knowing whether Ceolwulf excluded Alfred 
from London for reasons germane to his own exercise of power 
or that he did so at the behest of the Vikings is impossible.
9th-century Silver Halfpenny
 My conclusions contradict Haslam’s model for Ceolwulf ’s 
reign. As stated above, I find Haslam’s comprehensive view of 
Ceolwulf ’s reign inappropriate given the available sources. For 
example, I diverge from Haslam in my analysis of Alfred and 
Ceolwulf ’s relationship after the 877 sharing of Mercia. Haslam 
offered a detailed sequence of events in which Ceolwulf ’s 
alignment to Viking interests and disregard for those of Alfred 
facilitated a Viking occupation of London as part of a broader 
Viking settlement of Mercia that supposedly began in c. 875 and 
continued through 877.52 Haslam’s claim that Viking sharings 
occurred in both 875 and 877 rests solely on an interpretation 
of Æthelweard’s Chronicle and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's 
individual accounts of sharing as two separate instances of 
land allotment.53 As argued above, these supposedly separate 
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accounts probably describe the same sharing event. Æthelweard 
was probably mistaken regarding the sharing’s placement within 
the grander chronology of events, so it appears unlikely that the 
Vikings engaged in the two-part sharing which Haslam argues.
 Similarly, Nelson’s argument that the West Saxons and 
Mercians possibly cooperated at the battle of Edington does not 
depend on enough information  to be convincing.54 She bases 
her conclusion on a charter from Edward the Elder’s reign that 
references the forfeiture of land by a West Saxon ealdorman, 
Wulfhere, in which "all the councillors of the [West Saxons] and 
of the Mercians]" judged him guilty for desertion. Whitelock 
attests this charter’s genuineness but adds that it is contained in 
only one cartulary.55 Nelson argues that the "obvious explanation 
is that a West Saxon/Mercian alliance held good… surely, 
in 878" based on a reading of the post-Exeter events of 877, 
namely the sharing of Mercia, as developments to the expense of 
Ceolwulf ’s position resulting from his "alliance" with Alfred.56 
This argument, including the notion that in 878 Ceolwulf was 
still Alfred’s ally, elides the fact that Ceolwulf appears to have 
excluded Alfred from London after 877. Moreover, it seems 
unlikely Ceolwulf would have turned against the Vikings had 
they retained hostages from c.874 that Ceolwulf would not have 
been willing to part with—on top of the oaths he had made to 
the Vikings and which, if we are to judge the charter Nelson cites 
as authentic, Ceolwulf ’s contemporaries took very seriously. 
Ceolwulf and the Vikings
 I aim to describe Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the 
Vikings along the three points of rupture I identified as the 874 
accession of Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne, the 877 sharing 
of Mercia, and the 878 battle of Edington. The challenge that 
arises in this endeavour is that accounts of interactions between 
Ceolwulf and the Vikings are entirely contained in sources that 
probably originated in Alfred’s court. Once again, the issue of 
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the retrospective nature of Alfred’s sources must be considered, 
as should Pratt’s addition that the Alfredian milieu that probably 
composed the sources was itself inimical to positive portrayals of 
Ceolwulf.57 It is important also to remember that the Chronicle 
and its derivatives mention Ceolwulf in conjunction only with 
the 874 and 877 points of rupture that I have identified and not 
with the 878 battle of Edington nor the events that followed.
 Both the Chronicle and Asser’s Life describe Ceolwulf ’s 
nomination as Mercian king by the same Vikings who evicted 
King Burgred. Each source describes the supposed terms of 
Ceolwulf ’s oath to the Vikings; Asser wrote, “[Ceolwulf ] gave 
hostages to them under the terms of this arrangement, and 
he swore that in no way would he wish to countermand their 
intentions, but would be obedient in all respects.”58 The Chronicle 
adds that Ceolwulf also swore  to hand over as much of Mercia 
as the Vikings wished whenever they wished, suggesting that the 
new king was a puppet of his Viking overlords.59 This view of 
Ceolwulf is softened somewhat by the king’s 875 charter discussed 
above as well as Æthelweard’s account of 874.60 As stated above, 
I have interpreted this charter’s lack of Viking and West Saxon 
witnesses as a sign that Ceolwulf ’s contemporaries in southern 
England possibly viewed him as a fellow, if inferior, ruler. That 
Ceolwulf felt confident providing rights in perpetuity to entities 
such as the diocese of Worcester suggests he did not consider it 
likely that his Viking overlords would ask him to give them his 
entire kingdom at a moment’s notice. A regnal list from Worcester 
that Keynes highlighted and that allotted Ceolwulf a five-year 
reign (874-9) opens the possibility that Ceolwulf may have owed 
his legitimacy to more than the Vikings’ support.61 Instead, as 
Abels has suggested, Ceolwulf may have been a member of the 
same dynasty as the first king of his name, Ceolwulf I (821-3) 
and his predecessor Cenwulf (796-821).62 Thus, Ceolwulf may 
have been more than a pliant noble whom the Vikings elevated. 
Consequently, there are grounds to view Ceolwulf ’s elevation 
as a continuation of established royal norms with the probable 
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precedent-breaking additions that the Vikings presided in large 
part over his accession and secured his loyalty through the taking 
of hostages and the swearing of certain oaths.
 For his part, Æthelweard makes no mention of oaths 
by Ceolwulf. All he says about the king in his translation of a 
lost version of the original Chronicle is that "At that time [in 
874 following Burgred’s departure] Ceolwulf held the kingdom 
of the Mercians."63 Moreover, it is useful to reiterate my stance 
that Æthelweard’s description of the Vikings’ 875 sharing of "the 
kingdom for themselves into two shares" did not, as Haslam 
argued, possibly indicate a sharing of Mercia itself but rather 
was a mistaken attribution of the event to 875 instead of 877.64 
Æthelweard’s account therefore did not claim that Ceolwulf 
made agreements with the Vikings involving oaths or hostages 
to secure the Mercian throne. I advocate for a middle path 
concerning these oaths and hostages between the extremes of 
Æthelweard on the one hand and the Chronicle and Asser on the 
other: Ceolwulf did perhaps owe his position to the Vikings in 
some way, though his agreement with them was not as extensive 
as Asser and the Chronicle made it appear.65 The possible shifts in 
the control of London around 877 that Blackburn observed in 
the corpus of Cross-and-Lozenge type coinage from c.875-c.878 
may indicate some aspects of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the 
Vikings around 877.66 As I have said, the possible cessation of 
production of Alfred’s Cross-and-Lozenge coinage points to the 
possibility that, after the 877 sharing of Mercia, Ceolwulf had 
to choose a side in the confrontation between Alfred and the 
Vikings.67 He chose the Vikings to whom he apparently owed 
his throne, who possibly threatened and/or carried out violence 
against his eventual share of the kingdom, and who probably still 
held hostages of his.
 Additionally, Æthelweard’s account of 877 in Mercia 
provides grounds that the Vikings did not enjoy the full authority 
over Mercian lands which the Chronicle claims Ceolwulf had 
sworn to them in 874.68 It also bolsters the case that Ceolwulf 
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viewed himself and was viewed by his contemporaries as a king in 
his own right.69 Æthelweard’s description of the Vikings’ ravaging 
Mercia in 877 may be interpreted as follows: after having agreed 
to a treaty at Exeter with Alfred, the Vikings were forced to 
leave empty-handed, and the army’s leaders needed some way 
to appease their probably disgruntled followers. Appeasement in 
the form of Mercian land may have been the next logical step 
for the Viking leadership, though some coercion was required 
to convince Ceolwulf to hand over the north-eastern half of his 
domain. The results of this coercion in the form of "ravag[ing] the 
kingdom of the Mercians" would have probably been movable 
wealth in the hands of the Viking rank-and-file, the promise of 
Mercian tribute, and an agreement providing for the Vikings’ 
settlement of north-eastern Mercia.70 Moreover, Ceolwulf would 
probably have been left in a weakened position following the 
Viking ravaging, making his possible decision to become an 
accessory to further Viking operations a pragmatic one. This 
scenario represents a useful construction of a possible sequence of 
events because it shows how the rupture of 877 may have taken 
place without the Vikings’ initially having installed Ceolwulf as 
a plenipotentiary who served at their whim. Instead, Ceolwulf 
aligned with the Vikings and away from Alfred while ceding the 
north-eastern half of his kingdom to the Vikings. At any rate, the 
combination of primary sources points to c.877 as a time when 
Ceolwulf began to act more to the benefit of Viking interests and 
to the exclusion of Alfred’s.
 Because Ceolwulf is not mentioned in written sources 
following the 877 sharing of Mercia, it is impossible to 
convincingly  discuss the Mercian king’s relationship with the 
Vikings after the battle of Edington, the third point of rupture 
in this period. Any number of misfortunes may have befallen 
Ceolwulf after the 877 sharing of his kingdom. The appearance 
of a Viking army in 879 at Fulham, the city upriver of London 
that Ceolwulf possibly continued to hold up to around the 
battle of Edington, provides grounds to consider the possibility 
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that Ceolwulf was no longer in control of London and, by 
extension, no longer ruled Mercia.71 Then again, there is also 
the possibility that this army sought to work in concert with the 
Viking army that had lately been defeated. Thus, Ceolwulf, an 
ally of the Vikings-at-large, allowed the Fulham army to travel 
safely upriver of London. It also seems possible that the Fulham 
army and the incumbent Vikings whom Alfred had defeated 
were hostile  because the Chronicle reports that the latter’s 880 
movement to settle East Anglia coincided with the former’s 
departure for Francia.72 Keynes suggests that the incumbent 
Vikings’ encampment for a year at Cirencester may have had 
something to do with Ceolwulf ’s "apparent demise" c.879.73 
Map of Routes of the Viking Armies
Williams and Naylor concur, arguing that the deposition of the 
Watlington hoard was probably connected to Viking ravaging 
conducted  while based at Cirencester.74 However, to conclude 
that the Vikings, to whom Ceolwulf had sworn oaths and who 
may have still held hostages from him, liquidated their possible 
ally after losing to Alfred means deriving a significant conclusion 
from the narrative sources’ silence. Moreover, the scholars’ 
assumption that the Vikings deposited the Watlington hoard 
is one that should not be considered as firmly as the authors 
present it.75 Again, the hoard might well have been left by locals 
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who wished to protect their possessions from nearby raiders for 
a variety of reasons; soldiers, even ones with friendly leaders, 
are still capable of stealing from the locals, a fact that may not 
have been lost on said locals. As unsatisfactory as it sounds, there 
simply does not appear to be enough evidence to piece together a 
coherent narrative following the battle of Edington or in locating 
the causes of Ceolwulf ’s departure from the scene. 
 In summary, the nature of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with 
the Vikings around the three points of rupture I have identified 
possibly proceeded in a way that accorded with the development 
of his relationship with King Alfred. That is, there are grounds 
to conclude that, in 874, the Vikings helped elevate Ceolwulf to 
the Mercian throne and established him as a supporter of theirs 
by taking hostages and having the new king swear oaths. The 
nature of these oaths and hostages is difficult to ascertain because 
of discrepancies between the narrative sources, which either 
detail in full the kinds of oaths that Ceolwulf may have made 
along with the importance of the hostages—or fail to mention 
anything of the sort. A compromise between the narrative sources’ 
accounts and surviving documentary sources in the form of an 
875 charter points to the possibility that from c.874 to c.877, 
Ceolwulf ’s peers in southern England probably viewed him as 
a ruler of equivalent standing.76 Furthermore, the 877 sharing 
of Mercia possibly signals a new order in southern England in 
which Ceolwulf aligned with the Vikings to Alfred’s exclusion. 
The possible cessation of Alfred’s minting in London suggests 
that Ceolwulf assumed sole control of the city in connection 
to his alignment with the Vikings. The root of this possible 
decision is difficult to parse from the lack of consensus among 
the Chronicle and its derivatives, which either state that the 
Viking devastation  of Mercia took place in the same year as the 
sharing of the kingdom or make no mention whatsoever of such 
violence. Numismatic evidence and some compromise among 
the Chronicle and its derivatives do appear to be convincing 
that Ceolwulf possibly assumed sole control of London c.877, 
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signalling a turn toward the Vikings and away from the West 
Saxon king. As for the nature of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the 
Vikings in the aftermath of their loss at the battle of Edington, 
nothing can  be said with certainty. The 879 context of southern 
England in which the Fulham army and the incumbent Vikings 
camped astride an ascendant Wessex is too vague to determine 
the motivations of the parties involved and the ways in which 
they affected Ceolwulf.
 Secondary literature makes little mention of Ceolwulf ’s 
relationship with the Vikings except for the suggestion by 
some that the Vikings’ 879 stay at Cirencester contributed to 
Ceolwulf ’s downfall. For its part, the Chronicle reports that, after 
making peace with Alfred in 878, Guthrum’s army travelled 
to Cirencester, where it stayed a year before leaving for East 
Anglia.77 Williams and Naylor argue that perhaps the deposition 
of the Watlington hoard coincided with the move to East Anglia 
and further argue the hoard is of Viking origin, implying that 
the hoard probably represents a part of the Vikings’ loot from 
conflict with Ceolwulf during the stay at Cirencester.78 It is 
perhaps more likely, however, that locals instead deposited this 
hoard. Moreover, there is little ground to support the authors’ 
conclusion that Guthrum’s yearlong 879 stay at Cirencester 
"must have been devastating for Ceolwulf ’s position" because we 
know almost nothing about the political context of southwestern 
Mercia by the time of the battle of Edington, much less over a 
year later.79 The simultaneous presence of another Viking army 
upriver of London at Fulham suggests that Ceolwulf was either in 
dire straits, receiving friendly Viking reinforcements, or perhaps 
out of the picture.80 Therefore, the authors’ conclusions regarding 
the Vikings’ 879 stay at Cirencester need not be considered likely.
 My assessment of Ceolwulf ’s status among Alfred and 
the Vikings as a fellow ruler of southern England between c.874 
and c.877 agrees with Nelson’s conclusion that Ceolwulf was "far 
more than the mere Danish puppet-ruler implied by the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle."81 However, my conclusions regarding the state 
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of Ceolwulf ’s relationship with the Vikings diverge from her 
argument that Ceolwulf and the Mercians over whom  he ruled 
by 878 possibly fought alongside Alfred against the Vikings.82 
Nelson based this argument on a 901 charter from Edward 
the Elder’s reign that references a council at which both West 
Saxon and Mercian officials witnessed the official forfeiture of a 
certain Wulfhere’s land.83 Even if one ignores the probable nature 
of Ceolwulf ’s accession to the Mercian throne as at least under 
Viking auspices, it does not appear possible that the Mercian king 
restored the "West Saxon/Mercian alliance."84 It appears instead 
that his reasons for siding with the Vikings in c.877 probably 
included the oaths that he had sworn to them, the hostages of 
his they held, and their ravaging of his land. This last point had 
possibly left him too weak to continue ruling without allying 
with one of his more powerful neighbours. That Ceolwulf appears 
to have excluded Alfred from London as a possible consequence 
of the sharing of Mercia indicates that he probably picked the 
Viking side in 877. Furthermore, since Ceolwulf received negative 
treatment in the Chronicle, a source probably created in Alfred’s 
court based on Whitelock and Keynes’ conclusions, it does not 
appear at all likely that Ceolwulf disappeared from historical 
view c. 879 as a friend of the West Saxons.85 Additionally, I agree 
with Whitelock that the Chronicle’s intended audience probably 
would have been aware of the events of the 870s. This audience 
would thus have been surprised beyond the bounds of their 
willing suspension of disbelief to see Ceolwulf maligned as a 
"foolish king’s thegn" had he not turned his back in 877 on any 
friendly agreements he may have had with Alfred.86
 My model of Ceolwulf ’s reign contradicts Haslam’s far 
more intricate model of the fate of London during the period. 
Haslam argues that there are significant grounds to conclude that 
the Vikings occupied London after the 877 sharing of Mercia. 
He argues based on a reading of Æthelweard’s 875 account 
of the sharing of the Viking kingdom to explain Blackburn’s 
finding that London’s moneyers ceased to produce coins for 
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Alfred after 877.87 Haslam builds this case on assumptions that 
do not stand on solid ground. Haslam considers Æthelweard’s 
875 sharing a separate event from the Chronicle’s 877 sharing, 
an assumption I argue above should be replaced by considering 
the supposedly dual sharings as a single event.88 I argue that 
the discrepancy of dating between the sources can probably be 
chalked up to a chronological mistake by Æthelweard. Haslam 
also assumed that the intentions and interests of the three sides, 
Alfredian, Ceolwulfian, and Viking, could be considered almost 
as primary sources of their own.89 The issues with driving one’s 
analysis of events during Ceolwulf ’s reign with musings on each 
ruler’s view of the purported activities of the others are twofold: 
first, the lens through which we view such intentions is, in all 
probability,ultimately one of Alfred’s construction; second, it is 
misleading and rash to try to piece together the motivations of 
people who lived nearly 1150 years before our time and whose 
context, individual quirks, and goals are lost to us. We may, as 
Pratt does, conclude something approaching Alfred’s goals and 
motivations through examination of the considerable body of 
literary sources left from his reign which were probably composed 
by him and his court, but the same cannot be said either for 
Ceolwulf or the Vikings who probably put him in power.90
 
Conclusion
 The picture of King Ceolwulf II of Mercia that emerges 
from my analysis is one of a king who initially managed to take 
advantage of the lull in conflict between his two greater neighbours 
in order to cultivate positive relationships with them and secure 
his status as a fellow king. The changing political circumstances 
of southern England in 876-7 then probably forced Ceolwulf 
to side with his initial sponsors, the Vikings, who took the 
opportunity in c.877 to share Mercia between themselves and 
him. Then Ceolwulf ’s story trails off unsatisfactorily: the 878 
battle of Edington may have led to myriad outcomes in terms of 
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both Ceolwulf ’s fate and his relationships with his neighbours. 
For all we know, Ceolwulf may have stepped down as his 
predecessor had and then lived in obscurity long after 878. 
 New evidence, such as the Watlington hoard find, helps 
to contest prior conclusions regarding the changing state of 
London during Ceolwulf ’s reign and thus provides a window 
into his relationships with his neighbours. It appears likely that, 
from 874 to 877, Ceolwulf and Alfred continued the monetary 
union which Ceolwulf ’s predecessor Burgred had with Alfred. 
This finding provides reasons  to view Alfred’s relationship 
with Ceolwulf as positive and may itself corroborate the notion 
that Ceolwulf acted, viewed himself, and was viewed as a king 
in his own right during this period. This conclusion should be 
tempered by accounts in the Chronicle and Asser’s Life, however, 
which claim that Ceolwulf swore oaths to the Vikings and gave 
them hostages in exchange for his throne.91 Yet, as Æthelweard 
rarely appears to have been mistaken in his translation of a lost 
version of the Chronicle, his lack of mention of oaths and hostages 
erodes the certainty that the Vikings had the kind of leverage 
on Ceolwulf from 874 onward that would have placed him 
under their control before 877.92 After 877, the year Ceolwulf 
apparently consented to the sharing of Mercia, it appears possible 
that a mixture of the ravaging that Æthelweard described as well 
as oaths and hostages that Asser and the Chronicle described led 
to Ceolwulf aligning with the Vikings. Numismatic evidence 
may indicate that Ceolwulf excluded Alfred from London as 
part of with his alignment with the Vikings.93 I have assumed, 
in the lineage of Whitelock and Keynes, that the Chronicle 
and Asser’s Life were probably composed in Alfred’s court and 
probably remained consistent  with the West Saxons’ memory 
of the events of Ceolwulf ’s reign.94 In all likelihood,  Alfred and 
his officials viewed Ceolwulf negatively by the 890s and recorded 
him that way because of his later alignment with the Vikings 
and, as Pratt suggests, his narrative expediency as a foil to Alfred’s 
"language of wealth and wisdom."95 Ceolwulf appears to have 
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been a figure who straddled two eras: one in which the Vikings 
ran rampant through England, slowly conquering it from north 
to south, and one in which the House of Wessex reconquered 
those lands. Unfortunately, this king of ambiguous allegiance, 
origin, and demise left a mere glimmer of his story to us, and 
our accounts of him pertain to the latter era, when the writers 
of history could categorize their protagonists into winners and 
foolish king’s thegns.
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